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ABSTRACT 
In his new book, Luck Egalitarianism, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen responds to 
challenges raised by social egalitarians against luck egalitarianism. Social 
egalitarianism is the view according to which a just society is one where people relate 
to each other as equals, while the basic premise of luck egalitarianism is that it is 
unfair if people are worse-off than others through no fault or choice of their own. 
Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the most important objections to luck egalitarianism 
made by social egalitarians can either be largely accommodated by luck egalitarians or 
lack the argumentative force that its proponents believe them to have. While Lippert-
Rasmussen does offer a version of luck egalitarianism that seems to avoid some of the 
main lines of criticism, he mischaracterizes parts of both the form and the content of 
the disagreement, and thus ultimately misses the mark. In this paper, we provide a 
substantive, a methodological and a political defense of social egalitarianism by 
elaborating on this mischaracterization. More work must be done, we argue, if social 
egalitarianism is to be dismissed and its concerns genuinely incorporated in the luck 
egalitarian framework. Until this is done, the supposed theoretical superiority of luck 
egalitarianism remains contested. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In his new book, Luck Egalitarianism, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2015a) offers a 
stimulating and innovative account of egalitarian justice - of what an ideally just 
egalitarian society would look like. On his view and for luck egalitarians in general, 
the basic premise of egalitarian justice is that it is unfair if people are worse-off than 
others through no fault or choice of their own. The motivating intuition is that the 
sheer bad luck of being born in a poor country, with a disability, or another un-
chosen disadvantage should not determine the course of someone’s life. Justice, then, 
requires that individuals who are disadvantaged in such ways be compensated for the 
consequences of their unfortunate circumstances. Lippert-Rasmussen offers a new 
luck egalitarian account that fits within the broader description of luck egalitarianism. 
On his view, people should be equal in terms of what they care about non-
instrumentally and not unreasonably. Such concerns may include people’s own 
welfare, but also their ideals and the welfare of others. Any deviation from this type of 
equality that results from factors other than individual choice and exercises of 
responsibility - that is, from bad luck - is unjust. Egalitarian justice, in other words, is 
a matter of ensuring responsibility-sensitive fairness, properly understood. 
One of the central aims of Lippert-Rasmussen’s book is to respond to the challenges 
that were raised by “social-relations egalitarians” against luck egalitarianism. That 
response is the main focus of this article. Simply put, social-relations egalitarianism - 
or, social egalitarianism as we shall call it henceforth - is the view according to which 
a just society is one in which people relate to each other as equals and are free from, 
for example, relationships of domination or oppression.1  In his recent book, Lippert-
Rasmussen elaborates on and brings together ideas from recent articles in which he 
critically discusses the social egalitarian position (2012, 2015b). He defends two main 
claims to bolster the luck egalitarian case. First, that the most important objections to 
                                                     
1
 The past three decades have seen the development of a number of social egalitarian 
arguments. See for instance: Anderson (1999, 2010b); O’Neill (2008); Scheffler (2003); 
Schemmel (2011); and Wolff (1998, 2015). See also, Fourie et al. (2015). In this paper, we use 
‘social egalitarianism’ – relational egalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism are also used 
(Lippert-Rasmussen uses “social-relations egalitarianism”). 
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luck egalitarianism in the social egalitarian arsenal do not stand careful scrutiny - 
leaving luck egalitarianism unscathed. Secondly, that the positive concerns of social 
egalitarians - the establishment of a community of relational equals - can largely be 
accommodated by the luck-egalitarian view. Social egalitarianism is, thus, neither 
superior nor fundamentally incompatible with luck egalitarianism. 
In this article, we highlight central elements in the intra-egalitarian disagreement that 
Lippert-Rasmussen fails to recognize to a sufficient degree. Our discussion repels 
some of his new attacks and simultaneously hits back at luck egalitarianism by 
clarifying how its foundations and aims remain substantively (section I), 
methodologically (section II), and politically (section III) unsatisfactory. In doing so, 
we emphasize what we take to be the most fundamental points of contention between 
the two accounts, and clarify some ways in which social egalitarians can respond to 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s attacks. Our reply does not espouse a specific account of social 
egalitarianism, but builds a defense from the constitutive elements shared by most 
theorists within this family. This defense, we argue, cast serious doubts on the 
superiority of Lippert-Rasmussen’s luck egalitarian conception of egalitarian justice 
and its ability to accommodate the concerns raised by social egalitarians. 
SUBSTANTIVE CRITIQUE 
Lippert-Rasmussen claims that social egalitarians reject the basic premise of luck 
egalitarianism entirely – that is, the view that “[egalitarian] justice is a matter of 
eliminating differential luck” (2015a: 218). It is more precise, however, to say that most 
social egalitarians believe that egalitarian justice is not exclusively and primarily a 
matter of distributing societal benefits on the basis of differential luck. Their view of 
an ideally just society encompasses a wide range of egalitarian commitments of which 
mitigating differential luck may be one. Indeed, they believe that luck egalitarianism 
underappreciates a rich depth of concerns that should be at the center of any 
plausible conception of equality: concerns with, for instance, status, power, 
sufficiency, freedom from domination, oppression, exclusion, marginalization, etc. So, 
while Lippert-Rasmussen claims that social egalitarians do not take differential luck 
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seriously, they might reply that luck egalitarians neglect a host of other important 
egalitarian values. 
As Lippert-Rasmussen does well to show, however, it is not true that luck egalitarians 
are oblivious to these other values. More specifically, we identify two strategies that 
luck egalitarians in general, and Lippert-Rasmussen in particular, tend to adopt in 
order to acknowledge those values - one which externalizes the relational concerns 
and another which internalizes them. 
The externalizing strategy: egalitarian justice can be defined as and reduced to 
(responsibility-sensitive) distributive fairness; but other things than egalitarian justice 
matter when determining what we ought to do all things considered, such as social 
relations, efficiency, sufficiency, and community. 
The internalizing strategy: egalitarian justice can be defined as and reduced to 
distributive fairness, and other values, such as social relations, sufficiency and 
community can be re-described to fit within this framework. 
The first strategy externalizes the concerns pointed out by social egalitarians, 
claiming that these are not matters of egalitarian justice, but may matter for other 
reasons when evaluating what to do all things considered in specific circumstances. 
The second strategy internalizes these concerns by claiming that they are, indeed, 
matters of egalitarian justice, and that distributive theories, suitably construed, are 
capable of acknowledging them. The most important elements of social 
egalitarianism, on this last view, can be re-described from within the luck 
egalitarianism framework. In this section, we illustrate and critically discuss these two 
strategies in turn. 
THE NARROWNESS OF LUCK EGALITARIAN EQUALITY 
 
An example of the externalizing strategy can be found in Lippert-Rasmussen (2015a, 
152-156), when he argues that egalitarian justice applies over people’s entire lives, and 
that we should compare the opportunities people have access to over their life as a 
whole, rather than at a given point in time. In reaching this conclusion, he discusses 
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Dennis McKerlie’s example of an ‘Unequal City’ in which the elderly live marginalized 
and segregated in a miserable retirement home, while the young thrive in a lovely 
residence nearby. The inhabitants of the Unequal City, however, all pass through 
those stages so that they are equal over their complete lives. After an interesting 
discussion of this example, Lippert-Rasmussen concludes: “McKerlie has identified 
some important intuitions that need to be explained”, but “these need not derive from 
egalitarian justice” (2015a, 190). This is a clear example of what we have identified as 
the externalizing strategy. Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the inequality between old 
and young in McKerlie’s example may be objectionable for reasons external to the 
value of egalitarian justice – for instance community.  
He claims: 
“what we are really responding to when we find his scenario objectionable is the sort 
of social relations or the lack of communal relations that exist between middle-aged 
and old people in his example rather than to some kind of inegalitarian injustice, 
distribution-wise. Indeed, there is a suspicion that the injustice that McKerlie focuses 
on, to the extent that it obtains, is of the sort that social relations egalitarians are 
concerned with.” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2015a: 189) 
On this account, the types of injustices on which McKerlie focuses would matter for 
reasons of community or solidarity, which, Lippert-Rasmussen claims, are not 
concerns of egalitarian justice. This, clearly, is an instance of the externalizing 
strategy.2 
In what follows, we will not provide an argument per se against the externalizing 
strategy. Instead, we want to suggest that identifying the externalizing strategy allows 
for a better understanding of an important source of disagreement between luck 
egalitarianism and social egalitarianism - a disagreement, that is, about the role and 
content of the concept of equality.  
                                                     
2
 For more on what McKerlie’s unequal city example and issues of age group justice tell us 
about our egalitarian commitments, see Bidadanure (2016). 
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For social egalitarians, a conception of equality that does not register the elderly being 
set aside and marginalized as wrong is fundamentally flawed. We should not have to 
seek non-egalitarian reasons to object to the Unequal City. Rather, these inequalities 
are exactly the type of cases that a conception of equality should be able to identify 
and condemn, because they are prime examples of the kind of unjust states of affairs 
egalitarians should want to avoid. Egalitarian justice is not reducible to distributive 
fairness, social egalitarians believe, and making it so impoverishes our conception 
unnecessarily. Responsibility-sensitive fairness might be part of the equation, but it 
does not encapsulate all our reasons to oppose inequalities, and our conception of 
egalitarian justice should reflect that. For Scanlon (2004, 18) for instance, we have 
sufficiency, status, power, and fairness (both luckist and non-luckist) based reasons to 
care about inequalities.3 
Due to this conceptual disagreement, Lippert-Rasmussen’s externalizing strategy is 
not likely to satisfy social egalitarian critics.4 In order to avoid talking past them, 
Lippert-Rasmussen must provide reasons as to why one should prefer a narrow 
conception of egalitarian justice to an inclusive and ramified one à la Scanlon. By 
ramified, we mean a conception of equality that relies on an explicit and fundamental 
appeal to a system of other important values to describe the requirements of 
egalitarian justice. The disagreement is not, then, about whether community, 
sufficiency, domination, etc. are values that should figure in our considerations of 
what we ought to do. The disagreement, rather, is about whether those values should 
be called upon to describe the requirements of egalitarian justice. When using the 
externalizing strategy, Lippert-Rasmussen conceptually insulates the luck egalitarian 
premise from social egalitarian concerns. But to convince social egalitarians, he will 
have to provide more fundamental reasons for why we should treat relational 
                                                     
3
 See also, O’Neill (2008), who argues that a conception of equality should be based on a prior 
account of what is bad about inequalities. 
4
 It might be worth noticing that some social egalitarians would seemingly approve of the 
externalizing strategy (e.g. David Miller 1976). The main targets of Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
critique, however, would not. 
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concerns as residual when they could be integrated as part of a broader conception of 
egalitarian justice.5 
There are at least two problematic implications of the externalizing strategy: the first 
concerns the applicability of luck egalitarianism and the second is political. The first 
problematic implication is discussed in Tim Meijers and Pierre-Etienne Vandamme 
(2017)’s paper, which is also featured in this issue. Because Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
account relies on a narrow conception of egalitarian justice, they claim, it is unable to 
provide a view on how its core principle relates to other values, leaving us without a 
principled way to adjudicate in situations in which these values are at odds. This casts 
the view’s relevance severely into doubt. These conceptual issues are more closely 
linked to the social egalitarian challenge to luck egalitarianism than Lippert-
Rasmussen assumes. The first kind of potentially troublesome implication of the 
appeal to the externalizing strategy by Lippert-Rasmussen is thus that it prevents his 
luck egalitarianism to be action-guiding in the way social egalitarians think egalitarian 
justice should be. We will return to the second potentially negative implication of the 
externalizing strategy in Section 3. It has to do with the political risks that come with 
the use of a conception of justice exclusively centered on individual responsibility. 
 
THE MISCHARACTERIZATION OF SOCIAL EGALITARIAN CONCERNS 
Social egalitarians, as Lippert-Rasmussen rightly notes, put much focus on relations, 
which they claim must take an egalitarian form. People must, according to this view, 
relate to one another in an egalitarian way. To social egalitarians, an egalitarian 
conception that fails to capture relational concerns, as we have just discussed, is 
inadequate. The second way in which Lippert-Rasmussen seeks to avert the social 
egalitarian critique is by showing that their concerns can be re-described in 
distributive terms. In this way, he aims to show that social egalitarianism can basically 
be framed as one particular variant of distributive justice rather than a fundamentally 
distinct conception of equality. In fact, he argues, a version of luck egalitarianism 
                                                     
5
 Note that this disagreement is different from the terminological one which Lippert-
Rasmussen discusses and dismisses in chapter 8. 
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could be construed which accommodates social egalitarian concerns completely. To 
illustrate this, he considers the example of the distribution of “the good of having 
social standing that is equal to that of another.” He then attempts to show the way in 
which luck-egalitarians “could sensibly object to unequal distributions of recognition 
that do not reflect differential exercise of responsibility” (2015a: 238). The point of this 
exercise is to show that what matters to social egalitarians can be subsumed under the 
distributive category, making the disagreement less fundamental (and potentially 
non-existent). This is an example of what we call the internalizing strategy. 
Lippert-Rasmussen’s point is that equal relations, social respect, freedom from 
domination, recognition, and freedom from public shame can be recast as 
equalisanda, all of which can, in principle, fit into a luck-egalitarian framework.6 To 
see how this is meant to work, consider Lippert-Rasmussen’s example of Mary and 
John - two distributees of “the good of having social standing.“ Lippert-Rasmussen 
asks us to imagine that “Mary and John have equal amounts of this good if, and only 
if, they relate to one another as equals. Mary has more of this good than John has if, 
and only if, [Mary] relates to [John] as a superior individual to an inferior individual 
and vice versa.” (2015a: 238). Setting aside whether this is the proper way of conceiving 
of equality more broadly (whether it is sufficiently rich to capture what we really care 
about, as mentioned in the previous section), another problem arises here. 
The problem is that conceiving interpersonal relations in terms of distributive shares 
fails to capture fundamentally non-distributive dimensions of the relational 
phenomena with which social egalitarians are preoccupied. As a result, Lippert-
Rasmussen mischaracterizes the pluralism on which the social egalitarian theory is 
built, which to an important degree resists individualization, incorporates a concern 
not only with outcomes but also with attitudes, and, generally, defies the 
marketization of social goods involved in the internalizing strategy. To return to the 
example, then, saying that “John has a high amount of the good of social standing 
when he relates to Mary, who has a low amount of the good, as a superior individual 
                                                     
6
 For another attempt of this kind, see Gheaus (2016). See also Cordelli (2015) for a related 
discussion about the distribution of relational goods. 
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to an inferior individual” does not capture all of what is at stake in the relation 
between John and Mary.7 
The redescription represents social standing as if it were something that is purely 
measurable in individual holdings (something that can be had) when, in fact, it is 
internal to a relation and cannot be captured adequately by looking only at John or 
Mary individually. Unequal social standing is a particular manner of human 
interaction and important parts of this are lost when focusing only on how this 
interaction impacts John or Mary’s individual holdings or wellbeing. By 
individualizing relations in such manner, the internalizing strategy overlooks the 
fundamentally social and interpersonal nature of their constituent components: 
status, respectful treatment, non-domination, esteem, etc. A society, in which people 
relate to each other as equals, has intrinsic value as well – and undermining this can 
be wrong, even if it harms no one. By focusing only on how individuals are affected, 
the luck egalitarian redescription fails to capture one important feature of equal and 
respectful relations – namely, its intrinsic value.8 
The internalizing strategy re-describes social egalitarianism as outcome-oriented by 
focusing only on how relations affect distributions. The relation between John and 
Mary, for example, is evaluated via the distribution of “the good of social standing.” 
But relating to one another as equals is not (just) a matter of outcomes or holdings. It 
is also, for example, about considerate treatment and respectful attitudes towards 
fellow citizens (and human beings, more generally).9 As Christian Schemmel puts it: 
“we do not only have to distribute properly, we also have to treat people properly 
while doing so: the latter consideration functions as a constraint on the former” (2012, 
141). How unequal relations affect the wellbeing and holdings of the relevant 
individuals is certainly one aspect of what should concern us, but it is not all that 
matters. There is something bad, inegalitarian, and unjust about a society in which 
oppressive attitudes, and outlooks prevail – such relations are bad regardless of how it 
                                                     
7
 See Young (1990), chap. 1, for another critical discussion of this internalizing tendency. 
8
 See also, Fourie (2012) for a related distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental harms 
of social inequalities. See also Miller (1998), 24.  
9
 See also, Slavny and Parr (2015) for an argument to this effect on the topic of discrimination. 
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impacts people’s shares and opportunities (although, social egalitarians agree, it is 
worse if they do).10 Lippert-Rasmussen’s redescription cannot capture this element 
either because the wrongness of relations consists in more than their effect on 
individual holdings. 
One key problem with luck egalitarianism, thus, is that it cannot capture all concerns 
of unequal relations, domination, oppression, or differences in social status, in a 
satisfactory manner – at least, not by way of the two strategies employed by Lippert-
Rasmussen. When luck egalitarians attempt to externalize the concerns – by 
admitting that they are important but not as concerns of egalitarian justice – their 
concept of equality risks becoming unduly narrow rendering it inoperative (and, as we 
will discuss in Section 3, politically problematic). If luck egalitarians seek to 
internalize relational concerns, on the other hand, they risk mischaracterizing and 
distorting the wrongness at stake in these relationships. Substantively and 
conceptually, Lippert-Rasmussen’s version of luck egalitarianism will thus not satisfy 
social egalitarians since its value foundation is too narrow. 
METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE 
Moving on from our normative critique, we believe that Lippert-Rasmussen overlooks 
a number of ways in which social egalitarianism differs methodologically from luck 
egalitarianism. And when Lippert-Rasmussen claims that luck egalitarianism, 
properly understood, is immune to social egalitarian objections, he is trading on this 
misconception. Part of what he portrays as substantive differences between the two 
accounts is, in fact, better conceived of as a methodological difference. Because of this 
misunderstanding, his luck egalitarian defence shields itself from the wrong type of 
attack and does not escape the methodological critique that is both implicitly and 
explicitly contained in (some versions of) social egalitarianism.  
                                                     
10
 See also Anderson (2010)’s ”third disagreement with luck egalitarianism” for a similar idea 
that justice is a virtue, rather than a state of affairs. 
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In particular, this is clear when Lippert-Rasmussen (2015a, 233) complains that 
Elizabeth Anderson uses an imprecise language: rather than saying, “this is false,” for 
instance, she says “it feeds the suspicion,” or ”bolsters the objection.”  This, we think, 
is symptomatic of a deeper disagreement about the role and methods of political 
philosophy. To ground this, we will first show how the accusation of imprecision is 
better understood as a difference in the way in which ideals are constructed. Building 
on this, we will then claim that it is, in fact, a misunderstanding to say that social 
egalitarians are vague; their precision merely occurs at a different level of abstraction. 
When it comes to theorizing inequalities while remaining sensitive to the actual ways 
in which they emerge, cluster, pervade and prevail, the charge of imprecision can in 
fact be turned against luck egalitarians. 
ABSTRACT ANALYTICAL INDETERMINACY 
Lippert-Rasmussen lists the negative aims of social egalitarianism in a number of 
different ways: they aim to “end oppression,” eliminate “relations between superior 
and inferior persons” (Anderson 1999, 312) and are opposed “to oppression, heritable 
hierarchies of social status, to ideas of caste, to class privilege and the rigid 
stratification of classes, and to the undemocratic distribution of power” (Scheffler 
2003, 22). Their positive formulation, on the other hand, usually amounts to 
variations of the relatively vague notion that citizens “must be able to relate to each 
other as equals”. Lippert-Rasmussen laments this fact, arguing: “accounts of their 
ideal are more sketchy and incomplete than one might have wished for” (2015a, 181) 
and generally noting that it is difficult to work out what exactly we are to aim for if we 
wish to realize the social egalitarian ideal. His claim, then, is that the social egalitarian 
ideal is vague and indeterminate, whereas the basic premise of luck egalitarian justice 
– that we must ensure responsibility-sensitive fairness – is comparatively precise. 
Granting (for now) that Lippert-Rasmussen is right about the relative indeterminacy 
of the social egalitarian ideal, it is not clear that most social egalitarians would find 
such accusations detrimental to their endeavor. This is because many social 
egalitarians are practicing a different brand of political philosophy than luck 
egalitarians; or, rather, proposing different kinds of ideals. They do not see the 
purpose of political philosophy as being about developing moral and political 
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principles whose implications are intuitively correct in all possible worlds. Rather, the 
point is to offer moral tools and clear normative arguments to make better sense of 
what is unjust in current states of affairs - this is most clearly the case for Elizabeth 
Anderson and Jonathan Wolff.11 To them, many things about the contemporary world 
are fundamentally unjust and achieving hypothetical-world precision in our ideals is 
not necessary to provide normative arguments about how and why this is the case. 
This is not to say that social egalitarians do not also disagree substantively about the 
kind of conception of equality we should hold as an ideal (see first section); but it is 
often because they disagree about the roles such ideals are meant to play that their 
conception of equality differs. As Anderson (2010a, 3) notes, “knowledge of the better 
does not require knowledge of the best.” For this reason, indeterminacy regarding the 
question of what egalitarian justice requires in all possible scenarios (including purely 
hypothetical ones) is not necessarily lamentable. 
In more recent writings, Anderson (2015) has provided a set of arguments against the 
abstract analytical precision of ideal theorizing. Abstracting too far away from our 
current practices and values, she argues, is epistemologically problematic. We are all 
heavily influenced by social and cultural biases, which cloud our ability to clearly see 
what highly idealized societies and institutions might look like. Because of the 
pervasiveness of these biases and because of the epistemological difficulties involved 
in knowing how social ideals will actually function, Anderson maintains “that we 
should replace the quest for ultimate or highly general principles with methods for 
intelligently updating our current moral beliefs” (Anderson 2015, 22). In particular, 
Anderson mentions that we should seek to correct social biases, which tend to distort 
our thinking and discourses, and attempt experiments in living, which will provide 
practical knowledge about how certain injustices may be overcome (Anderson 2015 - 
see also, Anderson 2014). Both of these approaches, rather than seeking to abstract 
from biases and the circumstances of current injustices, seek to overcome them from 
within. This epistemological rejection of ideal theory may go much further than most 
social egalitarians are willing to go, but it is an additional potential explanation for 
the social egalitarian worry about abstract analytical precision. 
                                                     
11
 See, for example, Anderson (2010a), Wolff and de-Shalit (2007), and Wolff (2015). 
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Luck egalitarians (and ideal theorists more broadly) will still object to the 
indeterminacy of the alternative methodological approach of social egalitarians. For 
now, however, we simply note that Lippert-Rasmussen’s vagueness critique will not 
disturb many social egalitarians, because indeterminacy or open-endedness of this 
kind is not necessarily detrimental to the social egalitarian project, which is intimately 
tied to understanding and assessing existing social injustices. The standards, in other 
words, by which Lippert-Rasmussen judges his egalitarian adversaries are not the ones 
by which they all judge themselves. Whether or not this is a superior, inferior, or 
simply a complementary method for political theory is a discussion for another time, 
but it is, crucially, partly a methodological discussion and must be treated as such.  
DIAGNOSTIC PRECISION 
While social egalitarians often do not seek the abstract precision towards which luck 
egalitarians strive, this does not mean that they are imprecise. In this section, we 
challenge the double claim that social egalitarianism is, in fact, imprecise and that 
luck egalitarianism is more precise. Our claim here is that the precision of social 
egalitarians is pitched at a lower level of abstraction. At this level of abstraction, 
theorists are thoroughly informed by the workings of actual injustices. They seek to 
achieve what we call diagnostic precision. . Their aim is to correctly and precisely 
determine what is wrong in situations of injustice as they actually occur. To determine 
what the world ought to be, on this view, we need to understand the many ways in 
which the world is wrong right now. For this reason, diagnostic precision requires 
taking actually occurring political and moral issues as the point of departure, rather 
than possible or hypothetical ones. 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit (2007), for instance, discuss in important details 
how disadvantage tends to cluster in society, this way exacerbating existing 
inequalities. If we were all disadvantaged in one respect, they argue, egalitarians 
would not have much to worry about. What is normatively problematic from the 
point of view of equality is that disadvantage clusters in such ways that those who are 
disadvantaged in certain fundamental respects, such as the lack of access to income or 
shelter, incur high risks of becoming disadvantaged in other respects. The authors 
identify a range of disadvantages, some of which they claim are “corrosive” in this 
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manner – they yield further disadvantages. In doing so, they define a core aim of 
egalitarian justice, informed by a precise diagnosis of how disadvantage works: the 
eradication of corrosive disadvantages (whose corollary is the investment in fertile 
functionings, the promotion of which yields further advantages). The goal here is not 
to flesh out an abstract ideal for the distribution of the individual advantages and 
disadvantages (as a luck egalitarian might do). Rather, the aim is to precisely describe 
the reasons why some forms of disadvantage are more normatively concerning than 
others from an egalitarian perspective. In other words, their diagnostic precision 
stems from constructing their account around, and not abstracting from, the most 
salient features of how inequalities and disadvantages actually appear and function. 
This aim is fundamentally different from the abstract precision to which Lippert-
Rasmussen and most other luck egalitarians aspire. 
Similarly, Anderson’s reluctance to accept luck egalitarianism, we claim, is to a large 
extent motivated by her sociological, historical, and political sensibility and the 
accompanying wish to diagnose such injustices precisely. This sensibility leads her 
and other social egalitarians to adopt a conception of equality that does justice to 
both the actual ways in which oppression and exclusion operate and to the egalitarian 
struggles that have mobilized and continue to animate the social movements of the 
oppressed, including women, civil rights, anti-colonialist, LGBT, and workers 
movements. In this sense, Anderson’s complaint that luck egalitarians exclude the 
important aim that LGBTs be able to appear in public without shame or fear is not 
merely a worry that there is no way for luck egalitarians to properly account for those 
inequalities in the language of luck and circumstances. Social egalitarians (often, 
though not always) might say that the fundamental precision of luck egalitarians 
comes at a cost. It becomes too abstract and detached from the real injustices that 
most need to be overcome. Thus, if the goal of our theorizing is to develop tools to 
understand current moral issues, as social egalitarians believe, we must necessarily 
engage with, rather than abstract from, such experiences to say something that is 
relevant. 
But, the luck egalitarian may respond, how are we supposed to know which 
inequalities are most relevant without careful abstract theorizing? How can we know 
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which concepts, conceptions, mechanisms, and principles are most pertinent without 
knowing what we are aiming for (precisely)? To illustrate further how luck 
egalitarianism fails to diagnose actual injustices appropriately, one might take a closer 
look at the notion of individual responsibility – a theoretical cornerstone in the luck 
egalitarian infrastructure. As mentioned, the basic luck egalitarian principle states 
that it is unfair if people are worse-off than others through no fault or choice of their 
own. The formula thus requires attaching central importance to the dichotomy of 
individual responsibility and luck. But via this simplification, the luck egalitarian 
approach often obscures the mechanisms and processes that explain the wrongness of 
inequalities in real lives, which are almost never a product of responsible choice. 
When people face great obstacles to succeeding in life, social egalitarians hold, it is 
hardly ever because of irresponsible choices but (mainly) as a result of oppressive or 
exclusionary social structures, norms and practices. By focusing on responsibility, 
they obscure rather than illuminate the real causes of injustices, which become 
blurred under the individual-focused category of bad luck. In under-emphasizing 
institutions and norms as factors determining the consequences of choice and the 
social attribution of responsibility, they keep out of sight precisely the real-life 
inegalitarian practices, which cause and maintain the injustices that surround us.12 
Therefore, it seems that, at this level of abstraction, the charge of imprecision can be 
turned against luck egalitarians. If we contend, as Wolff and De-Shalit do, that the 
normative significance of equality is tied to the sociology of actual disadvantages, 
then we will find that luck egalitarian principles are comparatively detached from the 
mechanisms and rhetoric of inegalitarian structures. Their diagnosis of what is unjust 
about the world lacks sociological context and, in this sense, their normative 
theorizing is imprecise in at least one way. This is not to say that such discussions 
cannot teach us something about justice. It simply means that their pursuit of 
abstract ideal precision will sometimes come at the cost of diagnosing what is wrong 
about this world; and this is a cost that social egalitarians are not willing to pay.  
                                                     
12
 For a related worry, see also Marion Smiley’s (1992) eminent work on the inadequacy of 
equating individual responsibility with blameworthiness separately from the social structures 
and norms within which this blaming occurs. 
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In this second part of our paper, we have thus suggested that Lippert-Rasmussen’s 
critiques latches onto a methodological difference between the two kinds of 
egalitarian theories. First, quite a few social egalitarians resist employing the abstract 
ideal precision to which Lippert-Rasmussen adheres, and he must engage with their 
underlying reasoning to disprove the validity of their claims. Second, social 
egalitarians are, in fact, precise, although in a different manner; they are 
diagnostically precise – they rigorously analyze what is wrong with the mechanisms of 
actual injustices. We also suggested that, when evaluated from this level of 
abstraction, luck egalitarianism becomes the imprecise theory.  
POLITICAL CRITIQUE 
Anderson asks if luck-egalitarianism would have looked any different if it had secretly 
been penned by conservative writers (1999, 287). Lippert-Rasmussen, however, 
dismisses this as overly polemic. But separating the argumentative content from its 
polemical form, can something be said for the idea? We believe the claim contains an 
important political critique of luck egalitarianism – and particularly, of its tendency to 
reduce egalitarian justice to responsibility-sensitive fairness. 
One general, if often implicit, point in much social-egalitarian writing is that theories 
of egalitarian justice should not lend themselves to political projects, which work in 
the opposite direction of their ideal - and that luck egalitarianism does just that.13 In 
other words, an egalitarian theory should not help uphold or reproduce a system of 
inequality. Lippert-Rasmussen considers this idea briefly, but denies that principles in 
themselves can play such a role, since they should not be thought of as policy advice: 
“a true principle as such neither stigmatizes anyone, nor gives anyone an incentive to 
do one thing rather than another” (2015a: 233). Furthermore, he argues that it would 
be a mistake for philosophers to aim at producing the right political outcomes rather 
than seeking the truth, since political reality requires taking many different factors 
into account (such as efficiency, political feasibility, etc.) which are unrelated to truth: 
                                                     
13
 See Anderson 2015, 26, Wolff 2015, 11. See also Jubb & Kurtulmus 2012 
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“It would be an error to require a priori that the concerns of the egalitarian political 
philosopher do not diverge from those of the activist” (2015a: 233). 
Most social egalitarians, we take it, would not disagree with these statements, but 
some would be led to a different conclusion (particularly, Anderson and Wolff). Even 
if the egalitarian political philosopher should not be indistinguishable from the 
activist, she should not be unmoved by activist concerns either. Thus, some social 
egalitarians would emphasize that political theory is importantly political and holds 
the potential for actual societal transformation. We have already seen that social 
egalitarians build their theories around a broad conception of equality to better guide 
political action and that they work from precise diagnoses of actually occurring 
injustices rather than abstract (hypothetical) ones. And these theoretical aspirations, 
we claim, flow from a particular view of the role of political philosophers. 
Now, the purpose of this paper is not to flesh out how political philosophers should 
incorporate their status as political agents in their theorizing. Rather, we will say, 
more modestly, that there seems to be an underlying, implicit disagreement between 
the two egalitarian camps that Lippert-Rasmussen overlooks. Thus, for many social 
egalitarians, the disagreement is also about the role of political philosophy in politics 
and not only a disagreement about what the “true egalitarian principles” are taken to 
be. While they agree that this role should be different from that of the activist, they 
do not think, which Lippert-Rasmussen seems to do, that principles should be 
considered and developed in complete isolation from their potential (and even most 
probable) influence on politics.   
Importantly, then, political philosophers can and potentially do influence political 
debates and people’s reasoning and behaviour through their theorizing. And it is in 
this light, we think, that Anderson’s worry about luck egalitarianism looking as 
though it was penned by conservative writers - and Wolff’s worry that policy makers 
reading Ronald Dworkin would take this as underpinning Thatcherism, rather than 
egalitarianism (Wolff 1998, 112) - should be read. The problem, understood in this 
way, lies with the luck egalitarian fixation with the question of whether or not 
individuals are themselves responsible for their plight. This focus, they worry, is 
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highly susceptible to being appropriated by political agents working against the luck 
egalitarian cause and to being distorted by the dominant political discourses that 
serve to reproduce and legitimize current injustices through accusations of 
(ir)responsibility.  
To see how this may constitute a problem, note the following example of the 
stigmatization of the unemployed. People who do not have a job are often met with 
threats of having their benefits taken away or drastically reduced. The unemployed, in 
this way, are being held responsible for their ‘choice not to work’ and labelled 
‘benefits scroungers’; ‘welfare queens’; and ‘a lazy self-entitled generation’ in political 
discourses. The dominant feature of the current debate on unemployment assistance 
concerns whether benefits seekers can be held responsible for their unemployment 
and ensuing poverty. Because of this, as Wolff puts it, there is now a need to de-
emphasize individual responsibility and focus instead on fairness, compassion, and 
solidarity (Wolff 2015, 11).14  
Now, clearly Lippert-Rasmussen and other luck-egalitarians do not condone the 
stigmatization of the unemployed. There is however a political or strategic worry. By 
embracing, rather than circumventing or correcting for the political overemphasis on 
individual responsibility, luck egalitarians run the risk of (inadvertently) reinforcing 
anti-egalitarian political discourses that feed on a distorted view of individual 
responsibility (Wolff 2015).15 By dismissing individual responsibility from the center 
stage, social egalitarians, instead, seek to change the terms of the debate and offer a 
stronger political critique of the mechanisms used to exclude the disadvantaged. In 
other words, they seek to provide arguments that are more politically employable in 
subverting injustices and less liable to appropriation. It is in this way that the different 
role, which some social egalitarians envision for political philosophers, influences 
their theorizing. 
                                                     
14
 Note that this is not a problem with the value of responsibility per se but, rather, with a focus 
that lends itself easily to responsibility-assessment or holding people responsible (see, for 
example, McTernan 2015 for a responsibility-sensitive account which is not subject to this 
critique). 
15
 See also Kymlicka 2002, 93-96; 
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In response, it should be noted that several distributive egalitarians, including Ronald 
Dworkin and G.A. Cohen (and Lippert-Rasmussen) seem to think that re-
conceptualizing the key value of the right ‘individual responsibility’ is an important 
element of subverting the conservative ideology from the inside (Cohen famously 
notes that Dworkin has ”performed for egalitarianism the considerable service of 
incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian 
right: the idea of choice and responsibility,” (1989), 933). The social egalitarians 
mentioned above take issue with this strategy, claiming that it is politically unsound 
(and, as we saw above, diagnostically imprecise) and that its conservative core means 
that it lends itself too easily to inegalitarian misappropriation. Importantly, however, 
given their commitment to the strict separation of moral truth and political practice, 
luck egalitarians do not think that the choice of theory should depend on such 
matters. What we have identified here, then, is an implicit question about which 
forms of political jargon in fact do work to bring about a better state of affairs – and, 
further, a disagreement about how the answer to this question should affect 
normative theorizing. 
Some social egalitarians believe that responsibility-assessment is a process best 
avoided. Normative theorists, on this view, should avoid constructing theories which 
rely heavily on such processes because the political use thereof is heavily skewed 
against the worst-off. So, even if political philosophers should not emulate political 
activism they should not (and cannot) be apolitical either. Given that luck egalitarians 
advocate, and supposedly genuinely support a normative ideal of equality, they 
should concern themselves with the possibility that their theories contribute to 
discursively uphold inequalities that are due to bad luck rather than responsibility. 
Besides a substantial and a methodological disagreement, then, luck egalitarians and 
social egalitarians seem to disagree about the relation between normative theorizing 
and political practice. This disagreement is important, not only because it raises 
important issues about what political philosophers should be doing, but also because 
overlooking this dimension leads to misunderstandings of what is at stake and what 
needs to be resolved. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Lippert-Rasmussen’s critique of social egalitarianism misses the mark 
in three ways: (1) when seeking to externalize other values from the concept of 
egalitarian justice, his luck egalitarian account becomes unduly narrow in a way that 
would not satisfy most social egalitarians; (2) by not taking seriously the underlying 
methodological disagreement on the role of ideals in political theory, Lippert-
Rasmussen exaggerates the issue of indeterminacy in social egalitarian ideals; and (3) 
he underestimates the social egalitarian political concern with correcting the moral 
bias in discourses on individual responsibility. Furthermore, Lippert-Rasmussen’s own 
preferred conception of equality has important deficiencies from which social 
egalitarianism does not suffer: (1) substantively, it fails to capture important intrinsic 
and non-consequentialist aspects of interpersonal relations and (2) methodologically, 
it lacks diagnostic precision. More work must be done, then, if social egalitarianism is 
to be rebutted or their concerns incorporated in the luck egalitarian framework. Until 
these problems are overcome, the supposed theoretical superiority of luck 
egalitarianism remains contested. 
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